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This paper estimates the effect of institutions on economic performance using cross-city data from 
China. We argue that China's ongoing reforms are part of a long and circuitous historical transition 
from antiquity to modernity, which started about 150 years ago. Learning from Western countries 
has been a central aspect of this historical process. The West had a large influence on the early 
stage of this transition, which has persisted to current reforms. This study uses the enrollment in 
Christian missionary lower primary schools in China in 1919 as an instrument for present 
institutions. Employing a two-stage least squares method, we find that the effect of institutions on 
economic performance in China is positive and significant. The results are robust according to 
various tests including additional controls, such as geographic factors and government 
policy-related variables. 
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1. Introduction 
 
China's real GDP per capita has been growing at an average rate of about 7.4% for almost 
thirty years1 . While some suspect that China's GDP numbers have been exaggerated, the 
impressive economic growth of China is a widely recognized statistical fact. China's economic 
success is generally attributed to the reform and opening policies in place since 1978, which have 
transformed the economy towards a market system in a step-by-step fashion. However, the results 
of this reform have not been evenly distributed across the country. A country with a size close to 
Europe with one-fifth of the world’s population, China contains more than 300 cities with 
substantial variations in both production and institutions. For example the 2003 GDP per capita in 
Shenzhen, one of the fastest-growing cities in China, was 54,545 yuan, while it was 8,077 yuan in 
Chongqing, a city located in the mountainous area of Southwestern China. Different 
measurements show large variations in institutions among regions. For example, according to the 
Marketization Index constructed by Fan et al (2003), Guangdong was assigned a value of 8.41 in 
2000, while Xinjiang had a value of only 3.15. Research from the World Bank estimates that 80 
percent of the productivity gap among cities could be explained by the investment climate (World 
Bank, 2006). This paper tries to estimate the effects of institutions on China's economy using 
cross-city data. 
 
The topic of this paper thus relates to a general issue regarding economic development: how 
can we understand the large spatial differences in economic performance? Economists have 
offered various explanations. Many researchers believe that economic performance is rooted in the 
economic decisions of millions of individuals. When making economic decisions about 
investment, education or R&D (research and development), people and firms respond to 
incentives created by societal institutions. Therefore, some have argued that institutions are the 
most important determinant for economic development (North and Thomas, 1973; North, 1981 
and 1990; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 2004, 2005; 
Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Rodrik et al., 2004). In contrast, some scholars suggest that 
                                                        
1 According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, China's GDP per capita increased from 
381 yuan in 1978 to 14,040 yuan in 2005. The Consumer Price Index increased from 100 to 464 
during the same period (National Bureau of Statistics of China). 
geography shapes human history and plays a fundamental role in economic growth (Diamond 
1997, Sachs and Warner 1995, 1997). Others argue that human capital and government policies 
are the most important determinants of development (Glaeser et al., 2004). China provides a 
compelling setting to compare the effects of institutions, geography and policies. In addition to 
regional variation in production and institutions, China exhibits large differences in geography and 
government policies across localities. Compared with a cross-country study, one merit of 
considering the Chinese case alone is that there is only economy to consider with a uniform 
currency, legal system, trade regime and historic-cultural background, allowing for a comparison 
of the effects of institutions, geography and policies with less noise due to other potentially 
influential factors. 
 
One difficulty in estimating the effects of institutions is that institutions are endogenous. 
Richer economies are able to provide better education systems, more lawyers and prosecutors, 
better educated government officials, better public media and so on, resulting in better institutions. 
Moreover, there may be other factors, such as geography, that affect both institutions and 
economic performance. Because of the endogeneity of institutions, the OLS estimate of the effect 
of institutions on economic performance is biased, making it impossible to determine the causal 
relationship between institutions and economic performance. In order to obtain a consistent 
estimator, it is necessary to use an instrumental variable for institutions. 
 
Econometrically, estimating the effects of institutions on economic performance requires 
developing instruments for institutions. Mauro (1995) used ethnolinguistic fractionalization as an 
instrument to analyze corruption and bureaucratic efficiency. Hall and Jones (1999) used distance 
from the equator across countries as an instrument for social infrastructure. Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
employed European settler mortality rates as an instrument for institutions. However, there are 
some concerns regarding the validity of these instruments. Some authors have argued that 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization is influenced by economic performance (Acemoglu et al., 2001). 
Distance from the equator can affect the economy through climate and geography rather than 
through institutions (Bloom and Sachs 1998; Gallup et al., 1999). Glaeser et al. (2004) argued that 
historic rates of European settler mortality were correlated with the current disease environment 
and human capital, which could influence current economic performance directly rather than 
through institutions. 
We adopt the enrollment in Protestant missionary lower primary schools in the early 20th 
century as an instrumental variable for China's present institutions. Our logic is summarized in 
three arguments: 
 
1. China's present reform can be viewed as part of longer historical movement toward 
"modernization," which can be traced back at least 150 years. The main feature of this movement 
involves learning from the West to transform China from a pre-modern to a modern economy. 
 
2. Those geographic areas that have experienced a deeper historical influence from the West have 
developed institutions more favorable to a market economy and the protection of property rights. 
 
3. The enrollment in Protestant missionary lower primary schools in 1919 reflects the influence of 
the West in early 20th century China. 
 
We can sketch our logic as follows: the influence of the West ⇒ influences on 
institutions⇒ influences on economic performance. We perform a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
estimation and find that institutions are significant in explaining the variation in economic 
performance across the Chinese cities in our sample. The results are robust to various tests and 
show that institutions dominate geography and policy in explaining the economic variation among 
Chinese cities. 
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the historical background of 
China's institutional changes. Section 3 discusses our strategy to develop an instrument to identify 
the impact of institutions on China’s economic growth. Section 4 describes the measurements we 
adopt in this paper as well as our data set. In section 5, we estimate the effect of institutions on 
economic performance and check for robustness. Section 6 compares the effect of institutions with 
those of geography and policy. Finally, section 7 provides a conclusion. 
 
2. Institutional Change in China: A Brief Historical Background 
 
Although China's current reform started in 1978, many historians see this reform as the most 
recent dimension of a much longer and greater transitional process (Ray Huang, 1988; Degang 
Tang, 1998). This process dates back to 1553, when China allowed the Portuguese to anchor and 
trade at Macau, and it particularly accelerated after China experienced a series of military defeats 
to Western countries during the second half of the 19th century. Following the imposition of a free 
trade regime on China at several port cities, local Chinese markets became integrated with the 
international economy and markets at least by the 1890s (Brandt, 1985). Many Chinese then 
realized that China had to learn from Western culture in order to modernize its social system, 
which resulted in the introduction of modern industries into China. This process suffered many 
setbacks, but after the settlement of the Boxer turmoil of 1900 that led to the occupation of Beijing 
by eight Western countries, Western observers viewed China as having entered a new era. 
Although it echoes the current news coverage of China, the following remark is in fact a 
description by a Christian observer writing in 1919: 
"The two decades have been distinctly revolutionary in tendency: this not in the old sense alone 
which resulted in the displacement of individuals, but deeper, in that during this period ancient 
principles and institutions have been moved aside for something new. ... More significant than any 
other change has been that in the temper of the people. After all, the changes already registered 
are precursors of wider ones. China will not only reflect the changes going on all over the world 
but will materially help to change the world. Four hundred million people cannot wake up and 
leave the rest of the world untouched" (Rawlinson, 1922). 
 
In 1911, the Qing Dynasty became the final dynasty in China's history as it was overturned 
by the Xinhai Revolution and succeeded by the Republic of China. After the revolution and World 
War I, China experienced a rapid industrial spurt. The following quote provides a rough but 
impressive picture of the economy during the early years of the Republic of China. 
"The coming of modern industry to China has been described as 'terrific invasion'. This modern 
revolution is taking place so quietly that few people are aware that anything untoward is 
happening. To estimate the growth in terms of figures is not easy, since no authentic and complete 
list of factories has as yet been published. In the China Year Book of 1921 a list of "the more 
important trades" is given, showing that almost every type of industry is to be found in China, e.g. 
Arsenals, Canneries, Cement Work, Confectionery, Cotton, Chemicals, Breweries, Dockyards, 
Shipbuilding, Engineering, Flour Mills, Furniture, Glass, ...This list does not include certain 
industries with which the name of China is particularly associated, e.g. Carpets, Rugs, Porcelain, 
etc. The above are listed under some 50 centers scattered over China. The secretary of the Chinese 
Maritime Customs says, "There are foreign-type articles of domestic consumption that are not now 
manufactured in China by factories on modern lines, the majority without foreign assistance. For 
proof of this mushroom-like growth, return visits to some of our factory districts after an interval 
of a few months will suffice, or reading the notes under 'Industry in China' which appear in the 
Far Eastern Review or in the Weekly Review of the Far East from time to time" (The Christian 
Occupation of China, 1922). 
 
At that time, it seems that China was experiencing an early phase of what Kuznets terms 
modern economic growth. Railroads were expanded, and factories were erected. Between 1913 
and 1920, Chinese managers established 1,061 modern factories, employing over a quarter million 
workers with a capital investment totaling around 170 million Chinese dollars2 (Myers, 1980, pp. 
126). This development continued until World War II. According to John K. Chang's index of 
industrial production between 1911 and 1949, both the gross and net value production showed a 
rapid annual growth rate of around 9.4 percent from 1911 to 1936 (Chang, 1969). This growth rate 
is higher than that of the United Kingdom (1820-1870, 3.0 percent), the United States (1860-1914, 
5.9 percent), and Japan (1906-1935, 6.4 percent) (Myers, 1980, pp.135-136). 
 
However, the transition process was interrupted by the battle against Japanese invaders from 
1937 to 1945 and the subsequent civil war between the Kuomintang government and the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) from 1946 to 1949. When the civil war ended in 1949, the Republic of 
China moved to Taiwan, while the mainland was governed by the People's Republic of China. 
China continued to learn from the West, however, but this time from Karl Marx. The CCP copied 
the economic model of the Soviet Union and transformed the Chinese economy by embracing 
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central planning. The CCP government promoted manufacturing through high compulsory savings 
and distorted the low price of inputs. China built a rather complete sector of heavy industries, 
including oil, steel, ship and even aviation. However, a substantial gap is believed to have existed 
between China's economic performance and its potential during the planned economy era (Brandt 
and Rawski, 2008). 
 
In 1978, when DENG Xiaoping became the leader of the party, China began a series of 
reforms that gradually moved the planned economy towards a market-oriented system. In 1978, 
millions of farm households regained certain freedoms to manage agricultural production. 
Thousands of Chinese students were sent to universities in Western countries. State-owned 
enterprises began to publicly recruit managers in 1983 and then to issue stocks in 1987. In 1990, 
the public stock exchange was established. At the same time, privately owned and village-owned 
enterprises (TVEs or Xiangzhen Qiye) were encouraged and subsequently prospered. Between 
1978 and 2005, China's trade volume increased 68-fold in terms of US dollars. The FDI into China 
increased from 2.65 billion US dollars in 1984 to 189.06 billion US dollars in 2005 (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China). In 2001, China was accepted as a member of the WTO. 
 
In short, China's current reforms can be viewed as part of a long and winding road of 
"modernization" characterized by "learning from the West." Based on this historical view, we 
believe that influence from the West during the early decades of the 20th century has had a 
significant influence on China's current economic performance. 
 
3. The Instrument Used to Measure China's Institutions 
 
Before estimating the effects of institutions, we must consider how to define institutions. The 
term "institutions" is a concept that can include many phenomena, from general law to cultural 
conventions. Following North and Thomas (1973) and North (1981, 1990), our hypothesis is that 
the protection of property rights is key to explaining economic performance. Thus, we consider 
institutions as sets of social rules that protect property rights. Also following North (1981), the 
practical rules enacted during enforcement rather than the rules merely written on paper are most 
relevant. One report from the World Bank supports this argument, saying, "It is not just formal 
policies that matter. The implementation of policies is what is experienced -- with 95 percent of 
firms reporting a gap between what is on the books and how regulations are interpreted in practice. 
This gap provides a key opening to corruption and by raising uncertainty lowers the probability of 
investment by up to a third" (World Bank, 2006). Therefore, we focus on the implementation of 
property rights protection as an institution. 
 
China's ongoing changes can be collectively viewed as a transition from a planned economy 
to a market economy during which property rights are given increasing levels of respect and 
protection. Although different localities within China share a uniform political and legal system on 
paper, actual institutions – that is, the practical enforcement of the market system -- show large 
variations across regions. For example, the list of China's 100 most competitive private firms in 
2005 shows that the vast majority are based in just 3 of 32 provincial administrative regions in 
China's mainland, with 37 firms on the list from the Zhejiang province, 16 from Guangdong, and 
10 from Jiangsu (Liu, Zhao and Liu, 2007). 
 
How can China, a country with such a strong central government and such a uniform 
constitution and legal system, present so large a regional variation in institutions? First, although 
the reform and opening policies have been adopted by the central government, many specific 
reforms were initiated by local governments. Beneath the uniform political and legal system, the 
extent to which people engage with the market is largely determined by their confidence in the 
protection of property rights by the local administrative practice, which is highly influenced by 
local conventions and understandings. These local conventions result from the unique historical 
evolutions of local communities. We believe that current conventions are related to the historical 
influence of the West on local communities in the early 20th century. Since the modern market 
system and the protection of property rights are institutional establishments originating from 
Western countries, regions with longer histories of influence from the West should experience 
greater penetration in terms of market institutions. 
We use enrollment in Protestant missionary lower primary schools to capture the extent of 
Western influence. The earliest Christian mission in China can be traced back to 1582, when 
Matteo Ricci came to China. However, organized missionary activities began after 1841, 
paralleling the process of China's active learning from Western countries. During the Boxer 
turmoil in 1900, the Christian Church was largely destroyed in some areas. However, the Church 
soon rapidly recovered. Thus, Christian missions developed quickly during the early years of the 
Republic of China. Almost every province had Christian missionary centers, and almost every 
mission station had a lower primary school. Historically, Christians represented Western culture, 
so the extent of local Christian influence can serve as a measure of how much an area was 
influenced by the West. 
 
Since current institutions are related to the historical influence of the West, early Christian 
influence can serve as an instrument for today's institutional property rights protection. The data 
on our instrument is described in the next section. Panel A of Table 2 shows that the institutions 
under study are significant when regressed using the log GDP per capita in 2003. However, due to 
the endogeneity of institutions, this result should be read as a relationship of correlation rather 
than causality. Panel B of Table 2 shows that our instrument is significant as an explanatory 
variable for present institutions. 
 
The so-called “exclusion condition” with respect to using an instrument assumes that the 
instrument only affects current economic performance through institutions. To investigate whether 
this condition holds, we consider two possible violations of the exclusion condition. One concern 
is whether the historical enrollment of the Protestant missionary lower primary schools could 
affect the current distribution of Christianity in China, with the current Christian religion in turn 
affecting economic performance directly rather than through institutions. Missionary schools 
taught not only religious subjects but also curricula about Western epistemology. Long before 
1927, the number of required hours of Bible study in missionary primary schools had been 
reduced (Idabelle Lewis Main, 1934, pp. 270). The new curricula focused more on citizenship 
training and the Chinese language (Howson Lee, 1934). Kiang-wen Han (1934, pp. 313) 
concluded that "on the whole, religion does not hold an important place in the life and thinking of 
the students in China." Moreover, after 1949, the level of influence of all religions in China 
declined due to government-enforced atheist ideology and the suppression of religion during the 
Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1976. The recent revival of religion in China since 1978, 
which has included Christian missionaries, is difficult to measure. Besides the authorized 
missionary activities, there are variant forms of unauthorized missions, including overseas 
missionaries and underground churches. In general, we believe that the historical legacy of 
Christianity in China has little impact on the current incarnation of Christianity in China. 
 
More importantly, as Barro and McCleary (2005, 2006) argued, it is a general belief in God, 
the afterlife, heaven and particularly hell, rather than organized religious activities, that positively 
affect economic performance. Using cross-country data, Barro and McCleary (2005) found that 
after controlling for belief in heaven or hell, the Protestant religious population actually detracts 
from economic growth. The Chinese have a long history of belief in heaven, hell and the afterlife 
that dates back to the Han Dynasty (206 B.C. - 220 A.D.) and earlier (Yu, 1964, 1987). The 
introduction of Buddhism into China since the late Han Dynasty and its subsequent popularity has 
spread a belief in hell and the afterlife across China. Compared with Buddhists or with the mass of 
believers in hell and the afterlife, Christians are a small minority in China. We therefore believe 
that the enrollment in Protestant missionary primary schools in 1919 has very little influence on 
current Chinese beliefs about heaven or hell and does not directly affect current economic 
performance. 
 
We perform an intuitive test regarding whether our instrument affects current log GDP per 
capita directly. If the historical enrollment in Protestant missionary lower primary schools (our 
instrument) only affects current log GDP per capita through institutions, then our instrument 
should be significant when explaining log GDP alone but not significant when explaining log GDP 
along with other institutions. We see this exact outcome in panel A of Table 2. When we regress 
log GDP per capita in 2003 on our instrument alone, the coefficient of our instrument is 0.18, 
which is significant at the 5% level. However, when we regress log GDP per capita in 2003 on 
both the average protection of property rights and the historical enrollment of missionary lower 
primary schools, the coefficient of our instrument is not significant, while the coefficient of the 
average protection of property rights remains significant at the 5% level. 
 
The other concern about the violation of the exclusion condition is that the instrument is 
correlated with other unobserved determinants of economic performance. We test three possible 
underlying factors. First, if Christian missions were more prevalent in coastal areas than in inland 
areas, then our instrument could be correlated with distance to the coast, which could possibly 
affect GDP per capita across regions through several other channels, such as the acquisition of FDI 
and access to international trade. Thus, our instrument could affect economic performance through 
distance to the coast rather than through institutions. However, the distribution of Christian 
missionaries in 1919 does not correlate with distance to the coast. The Treaty of Tientsin between 
China and France in 1860 allowed Christian missions to establish their missionary stations far 
from the coast. The Most Favored Nation Clause enabled all Western countries to locate missions 
in China's hinterland. As Feuerwerker (1983, pp. 165-167) has described, "Protected by general 
and specific extraterritorial provisions of treaties, they reached into nearly every corner of the 
country. As of 1899 all but 106 out of 1704 counties or hsien in China proper and Manchuria 
reported some Protestant missionary activity." Panel B of Table 2 adds distance to the coast as an 
additional control in our regression of institutions and finds that our instrument is still significant 
in explaining institutions when distance to the coast is controlled.  
The second possible underlying factor is that the historical distribution of Protestant primary 
school pupils may affect the current economy through the channel of human capital. If higher 
enrollment means better educational conditions and higher human capital in the 1920s, then our 
instrument could influence current economic performance through historical human capital rather 
than through institutions. However, we believe this cannot be the case for the following reasons. 
Missionary lower primary school pupils were only around 4% as many as those in government 
primary schools in the 1920s (Albert Feuerwerker, 1983). We check this by regressing our 
instrument on the total primary school enrollment, which we employ to capture human capital in 
the 1920s. The result is reported in panel C of Table 2. There is no significant correlation between 
the two variables. 
 
4. Measurements and Data 
 
China's sub-national governments can be categorized into four administrative levels: 
province, city, county and town/village. There are only 34 observations3 at the provincial level. In 
the early 1900s, China had only 18 provinces, some of which have since been divided and merged 
into others. Using city-level data, we obtain more observations. Our sample consists of 47 cities as 
listed in Table A2. The sample size is restricted by the institutional data. One complicated issue is 
that city boundaries have changed substantially during the last 100 years. The data on the 
historical enrollment in Protestant missionary primary schools are at the county level. Since the 
county boundaries have been rather stable during the entire 20th century, the county-level data on 
Christian missions can be matched with the city-level data on institutions. 
 
As mentioned above, this paper focuses on institutional property rights protection. We note 
that it is always difficult to measure institutions. There are two basic methods to measuring 
institutions. One is a subjective measurement in which people's opinions about institutions are 
evaluated through a survey and then aggregated into a quantitative index. The alternative is an 
objective measurement based on statistical facts on the effects of institutions. For example, the 
wait time for obtaining government approval to start a business can be observed and used as a 
measurement for institutions. This paper uses a subjective measurement. The data are from a 
cross-city survey conducted by Pengfei Ni et al. in 2002 and 2003 (Ni et al, 2003, 2004). The 
survey covered 47 cities at the prefectural or higher levels. For each city, 2000 questionnaires 
were sent to scholars, entrepreneurs and randomly sampled citizens asking them to grade the city's 
performance in a wide range of aspects. For each listed item, the respondent selected from five 
options ranging from highest (favorable) to lowest (unfavorable). Ni et al set the highest option at 
1.5, while the lowest was set at -1.5. For each item, they calculated the mean score and then 
constructed an index ranging from 0 to 1 across 47 cities. 
 
This paper focuses on the index of property rights protection developed by Ni et al. This 
includes three sub-indices, namely, the extent to which the government resorts to informal tax 
levies, the protection of intellectual property rights, and the protection of contract enforcement by 
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autonomous regions, 4 province-level cities and 2 special administrative areas, Hong Kong and 
Macau. 
the legal system. We take the average of their index of property rights protection for 2002 and 
2003 as our main measurement. The city with the highest average is Xiamen at 0.896, and the 
lowest rated city in the sample is Wuhan at 0.5035. We find that among the top 10 cities with the 
highest average indices, 7 are from Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Guangdong provinces. These areas also 
had the most competitive private enterprises in China in 2005 according to Liu et al. (2007). 
 
Ni et al. also constructed an index for comprehensive institutions and a sub-index for 
informal government collection and fees. We use these two indices as complementary 
measurements to check the robustness of our results. 
 
The data on the historical enrollment of Protestant missionary lower primary schools is from 
a survey conducted by the Continuation Committee in 1920. The results of this survey were edited 
into a book titled "The Christian Occupation of China." The survey results include all county-level 
data on the enrollment of Protestant missionary lower and higher primary schools in 1919. We 
choose only the lower primary school data because the data on higher primary schools are rather 
incomplete. For example, there were only 306 higher primary schools reported out of the 693 
Protestant residential centers (Feuerwerker, 1982). Since the survey includes the population for 
each county as well, we can calculate the enrollment in missionary lower primary schools per 
100,000 persons, which thus serves as our instrumental variable for institutions. 
 
Finally, to measure economic performance across regions, we use the log GDP per capita for 
all cites in 2003 following Hall and Jones (1999). These data are obtained from the Urban 
Statistical Yearbook of China 2005 in terms of the Chinese yuan. In Table A1, we describe all 
other variables used in this paper and list the data sources. 
 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on our main data. The average of the log GDP per 
capita for all 47 cities in 2003 is 10.048, and the standard deviation in the sample is 0.4842. The 
maximum observation is 11.004, while the minimum is 8.996, which means that the GDP per 
capita of the richest city in our sample is almost 7.5 times that of the poorest city in 2003. The 
sample mean of the average protection of property rights is 0.6509, and the standard deviation is 
0.0979. The average enrollment in missionary lower primary schools is 72.258 per 100,000 
persons, and the standard deviation is 84.656. The maximum observation is 420.223 per 100,000 
persons, while the minimum is only 1.3828 per 100,000. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1 The Model 
 
Although institutions are significant in the OLS regression reported in panel A of Table 2, this 
result should be read as no more than a correlation. No causal relationship can be inferred between 
institutions and economic performance from OLS estimates. Moreover, due to the endogeneity of 
institutions, the OLS estimate is biased. Hence, we use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) method to 
estimate the effect of institutions on economic performance. The basic model is 
iiii XINSay εθβ +++=    (1) 
iii EbINS υγ ++= ,          (2) 
where iy , iINS and iE  denote the log GDP per capita in 2003, the average protection of 
property rights in 2002-2003, and the historical enrollment of missionary lower primary schools 
for city i , respectively. We use iX  to denote other control variables, such as distance to the 
coast, rainfall, temperature, approximate historical human capital, government policy and so on. In 
the first stage, we regress the observed measure of current institutional performance on our 
instrumental variable iE and the covariates iX . iυ  comprise the error term. In the second stage, 
we regress the current GDP per capita iy  on the predicted institutions derived from the first 
stage with iε  as the error term. Covariates iX  appear in both regressions. The parameter of 
interest is the coefficient β  in Equation 1, which is the effect of the institution under study on 
economic performance. Note that the historical enrollment distribution of missionary lower 
primary schools is not correlated with the structural error term in the second stage. 
 
5.2 Main Results 
 
Table 3 lists our main findings regarding the effect of institutions on economic outcomes. 
Panel A lists the estimation results from the second stage regression with the log GDP per capita in 
2003 as the dependent variable. Panel B lists results from the first-stage regression with average 
protection of property rights as the dependent variable. Table 3 presents the main specification 
with the enrollment in Protestant missionary lower primary schools as the instrument for 
institutions. The 2SLS estimate of the institution under study is 4.23, which is significant at the 
5% level for a two-sided t-statistic. 
 
Compared to the OLS estimate in panel A of Table 2, there are two noteworthy points. First, 
the institution coefficient is significant in both regressions. The coefficient in the 2SLS regression 
is 4.23, which implies that the city's GDP per capita will increase by 4.23% if its average index of 
property rights protection increases by 0.01. For example, if Tianjin could improve its property 
rights to Beijing's level, that is, from 0.64 to 0.68, then its GDP per capita would increase by about 
17%. Second, the value of the coefficient in the 2SLS is much larger than in the OLS regression. 
From this perspective, our results are similar to those of Acemoglu et al. (2001), as their 2SLS 
results are twice those generated from OLS. This shows that the OLS estimate of the effect of 
institutions is downward biased, which is the same as the findings presented by Hall and Jones 
(1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2001). 
 
We also report the value of the Anderson canonical correlation likelihood ratio test (Hall et al., 
1996). The null hypothesis of the test is that the first-stage regression is underidentified, i.e., that 
the instrument is not relevant. Under the null hypothesis, the test converges to a Chi-square 
distribution with one degree of freedom. The Anderson canonical correlation LR test reported in 





5.3 Possible Violations of the Exclusion Condition 
 
Section 3 discussed concerns about the validity of the exclusion condition for our instrument 
with several intuitive OLS regressions. As a robustness test, we insert additional right-hand 
variables into the 2SLS as additional controls to test the validity of our instrumental variable. If 
the exclusion assumption holds, the institution coefficient in the second-stage regression should 
not change remarkably when additional controls are added to the regression. The results are 
reported in Table 4. In column (1), distance to the coast is added as an additional control for both 
stages. In the first stage, both the historical enrollment of missionary lower primary schools per 
1000 persons and distance to the coast are significant. In the second stage, the institution 
coefficient is 3.779 and is still significant, but the coefficient of distance to the coast is not 
significant. This shows that distance to the coast is not significant in explaining the log GDP per 
capita when institutions are considered. 
 
Column (2) addresses the concern that our instrument might be correlated to the historical 
geographic distribution of human capital, which affects current economic performance. It is 
difficult to find data on historical human capital. We approximate this information with the total 
primary school enrollment per 1000 persons, which includes the historical enrollment of lower and 
higher primary schools of both missionary and government schools per 1,000 persons in 1919. In 
the first stage, we find that only the enrollment of missionary lower primary schools helps to 
explain the variation of institutions across regions and that the total enrollment is not significant. 
In the second stage, the institution coefficient is 4.304 and is significant at the 5% level, while the 
control variable is not significant.  
 
In column (3), we examine the possible correlation between the historical geographic 
distribution of enrollment in Protestant missionary lower primary schools and the initial conditions 
of different cities before the reform. We use the earliest available cross-city data on national 
income4 to measure the initial conditions in 19855. The first-stage regression shows that both the 
                                                        
4 We calculate national income as the sum of gross agricultural output values and value added in industry for each 
city. The national income per capita is the national income divided by each city's population in 1985. 
instrument and initial conditions before the reform are significant. In the second-stage regression, 
the institution coefficient is 4.115 and is still significant at the 5% level, while the initial condition 
is not significant. In column (4), we consider both distance to the coast and initial conditions 
together as the control variables. The 2SLS shows that neither of the two controls is significant, 
while the institutions under study remain significant. Overall, our estimates for institutions are 
rather stable in all specifications, supporting the argument that our instrument is valid. 
 
5.4 Different Measurements of Institutions 
 
We also test whether our result is robust to the measurement of the institution under study. 
One difficulty in estimating the impact of institutions lies in how to measure the institutions 
themselves, and in our case, how to measure the institution of protecting property rights. The 
measurement of this institution is always controversial. Whatever measure is adopted, there will 
always be some unsatisfactory aspects.  
 
As explained in the previous section, our main specification uses the average of the index of 
property rights protection according to two surveys by Ni et al. (2003, 2004). Ni et al (2003, 2004) 
also provides some other measures, such as the comprehensive index of institutions and the index 
for government collection of informal fees, which represents an abrogation of property rights. The 
comprehensive index is the general index based on a series of sub-indices that measure various 
aspects of each city's legal, government and enterprise systems. The index showing the prevalence 
of informal fees measures the extent to which the government imposes extra-legal charges on 
private businesses. Table 5 reports the results when those different variables are used to measure 
institutions. Panel A reports the effects of institutions on the log GDP per capita when the 
measurements listed on the left are used. Institutions are significant with all three measurements. 
Panel B reports the result of the first-stage regression when the protection of property rights is a 
dependent variable measured by the variables listed on the left. In all cases, our instrument is 
significant in explaining institutions. 
                                                                                                                                                               
5 The urban economic reform in China had not been launched on a large scale until 1985. 
6. Institutions, Geography and Policy 
 
6.1 Institutions versus Geography 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, geography may play a role in background, thus influencing 
economic development. Table 6 reports the results of adding geographic controls. One of most 
popular geographic variables used in the literature is latitude. In column (1), latitude is added to 
the regression. The inclusion of latitude does not substantially change the results. The institution 
coefficient remains significant and takes on a value of 3.559. Latitude is not significant in the 
second-stage regression, nor is it helpful in interpreting the variation of institutions in the 
first-stage regression. Other geographic variables include average temperature and rainfall. 
Column (2) adds average temperature as a control. In the second stage, we find that the institution 
and average temperature coefficients are 3.400 and 0.027, respectively, and that both estimators 
are significant. However, the average temperature is not significant in the first-stage regression, 
i.e., it does not help us to interpret the variation of institutions across regions. In column (3), 
rainfall is added to the regression. The institution coefficient is significant and takes on a value of 
3.949. Rainfall is not significant in either stage. 
 
Besides institutions, another channel that may have an effect on today's economy is through 
culture, which is nonetheless geographically related. Therefore, we test our argument by 
controlling for culture across localities. Given the complicated cultural differences across various 
localities in China, the most prominent is the cultural difference between the North and South as 
divided by the Yangzi River, which is discussed by Diamond (1997). Thus, in column (4), we use 
a north-south dummy as another control variable. If a city is located south of the Yangzi River, we 
set the dummy to 1 and 0 otherwise. The institution coefficient is 3.950 and significant at the 5% 
level. The south-north dummy is not significant in either stage and thus does not help us to 
understand the variation of institutions across localities. In column (5), all these geographically 
related variables are added to the regression. The institution coefficient is significant and takes a 
value of 3.479. No other coefficients are significant. 
 
Overall, adding geographically related variables does not have a significant effect on the 
institution estimates. The institution estimates instrumented using the historical distribution of 
enrollment in missionary lower primary schools are rather stable and always significant, as shown 
in Table 6. 
 
6.2 Institutions versus Policies 
 
Some economists have argued that government policy is more important than institutions in 
promoting economic growth (Edward Glaeser, et al., 2004). To test this argument in the case of 
China, we add some policy variables to the main specification of 2SLS regression. One policy 
variable we use is the dummy variable for central government policy. For a long period, China 
was divided into three regions in terms of economic policy, namely, eastern, central and western 
regions, each of which was assigned a specific economic task.6 Although the income per capita 
varies greatly across the country, it exhibits convergence within each of these three regions. Some 
believe this is due to the different development strategies adopted by the government for different 
regions (Lin, 2004). For example, the eastern region enjoys a more favorable policy for the 
development of light industries, while the central and western regions have long been focused on 
agriculture and heavy industries. We use two dummies to capture a city's policy zone, namely, east 
and west. If a city falls in the east zone, its east dummy is set as 1, and its west dummy is set as 0. 
If a city falls into the west zone, its east dummy is 0 and west 1. If a city falls into the middle zone, 
then both dummies are set equal to 0. The results reported in column (1) of Table 7 show that none 
of the zone dummies are significant in the second stage, while the average protection of property 
rights is still significant, with a coefficient of 3.866. In the first stage, our instrument is still 
significant in interpreting the variation of institutions across regions, and the coefficient is 
relatively stable. The west dummy is not significant in the first stage. The east dummy is 
significant with a value of 0.107 in the first stage. Thus, it seems that the central government 
                                                        
6 In this paper, the eastern region includes Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Macau, 
Liaoning, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan. The central region 
includes Hebei, Shanxi, Neimenggu, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hunan, and 
Hubei. The western region includes Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Chongqing, Shaanxi, 
Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Xingjiang and Xizang. Taiwan is not included in our analysis here. 
development policy is not the main explanation for the difference in GDP across the cities in our 
sample. 
 
Column (2) of Table 7 includes a dummy for open coastal cities as an additional control. 
Open coastal cities have benefited from more favorable policies regarding economic reform and 
development. When the dummy for open coastal cities is included, the coefficient of institutions is 
4.405 and is significant at the 5% level in the second-stage regression. The coefficient of the 
dummy for open coastal cities is not significant in either stage.  
 
China's cities have different administrative ranks. The top rank includes provincial-level 
cities (zhixiashi), such as Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing. The second rank is the 
deputy-provincial level (fushengji) cities, and the third rank is the prefectural-level cities (dijishi), 
which includes all cities outside the top 2 ranks. The fourth-rank cities are below the prefectual 
level, i.e., county-level cities (xian). The 47 cities in our sample are all from the top three 
administrative ranks. A higher administrative rank usually means greater political power in 
competing for economic resources and more favorable policies from the central government. In 
column (3) of Table 7, we construct a dummy for provincial and deputy-provincial-level cities and 
include it in the regression as an additional control. The dummy takes a value of 1 when a city 
belongs to a provincial or deputy-provincial level. When the dummy for the provincial and 
deputy-provincial levels is controlled, the institution coefficient is 4.249 and is significant at the 
1% level. The dummy for the provincial and deputy-provincial levels is not significant in both 
stages. In column (4), we control for the above two dummies in the regression at the same time. 
We find that only the institution coefficient is significant at 4.393. 
 
In the literature on empirical economic growth, the ratio between government consumption 
and real GDP is used to measure the extent of government involvement (Barro, 2000). In column 
(5), the ratio between government consumption and real GDP is included as an additional control. 
The institution coefficient is significant with a value of 4.035. The ratio between government 
consumption and real GDP is not significant in either stage. 
 
The investment rate is considered to be important for developing countries. We also examine 
the investment ratio to GDP as an underlying factor. However, when we regress our instrument on 
the investment rate for 2004, we find that there is no significant correlation between the two. 
When the investment rate is added as an explanatory variable, we find that our instrument is still 
significant in explaining the institution under study at the 1% level. Column (6) reports the result 
of adding the investment rate as a control. We find that both the institution under study and the 
investment rate are significant in explaining economic performance. 
 
The results in Table 7 do not support the argument that policy plays a more important role 
than institutions in economic development. On the contrary, our results show that institutions 




Many economists believe that institutional change is a fundamental reason for China's 
impressive economic performance during the last twenty years. However, since institutions are 
widely believed to be endogenous, it is difficult to evaluate their effect. Following the method 
developed by Mauro (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), and by Acemoglu et al. (2001), we try to 
isolate the exogenous part of the variation in the institution of property rights protection across 
cities in China. We choose enrollment in Protestant missionary lower primary schools in 1919 as 
the instrument for China's present institutions. We believe that the enrollment in Protestant 
missionary lower primary schools captures the extent of influence from Western countries in the 
early 20th century. Since the central aspect of China's institutional transition has involved learning 
from the West, the historical influence of the West in the early 20th century may persist in China's 
current institutional changes. 
 
Using cross-city data in China, we use the two-stage least squares method (2SLS) to estimate 
the effect of the institution under study on China's economic performance. The results show that a 
high correlation exists between the 1919 enrollment in Protestant missionary lower primary 
schools and present institutions. The 2SLS estimate shows that institutions are significant in 
explaining the variation of economic performance among our sample of 47 Chinese cities. Our 
estimate resembles the result of Acemoglu et al. (2001) in that the 2SLS estimate is much greater 
than the OLS estimate. The significance of the institution under study is robust to various tests that 
include control variables such as distance to the coast, historical human capital and initial 
conditions for different cities. 
 
The paper also addresses the question of which element plays the most important role in 
economic performance. We compare the effect of institutions with that of geography and 
government policy. By controlling for geographic variables such as latitude, temperature, rainfall 
and north-south cultural differences, we find that institutions are significant, while geography is 
not significant, in explaining the variation of economic performance in our sample. When we 
control for government policies such as China's zone development policy, coastal city policy and 
government consumption ratio to local GDP, the institution under study is still significant, while 
government policies are not. These results support the hypothesis that institutions occupy a central 
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Note: The sample size for all variables is 47. The standard deviations are reported in the 
parentheses under the means.  
 
 
                             Table 1: Descriptive Statistics. 
 Sample Mean Minimum Maximum 
 















Christian lower primary school enrollment 
(Enrollment in Christian missionary lower primary 





Table 2: The Relationship between the Instrument and the Institutions in China. 











R2 0.15 0.10 0.18 
Panel B. OLS: The Dependent Variable is Institutions. 








Distance to the coast  -0.007** 
(0.002) 
 
Investment rate in 2003   0.272* 
(0.137) 
R2 0.14 0.25 0.21 
             Panel C. OLS: The Dependent Variable is Christian Lower 
Primary School Enrollment. 
Distance to the coast -0.0374 
(0.027) 
  
Total primary school enrollment  0.005 
(0.02) 
 
Investment rate in 2003   -1.961 
(1.257) 
R2 0.038 0.001 0.05 
 
Note: Standard errors of estimated coefficients are in parentheses.  
***: significant at 1%   
**: significant at 5%   




Table 3: The Effects of the Institutions on Economic Performance. 
Panel A: 2SLS  
4.230** Institutions 
(1.940) 
Panel B: First-Stage Regression  









Notes: Panel A reports 2SLS estimates with the log GDP per capita in 2003 as the dependent variable, and Panel B 
reports the corresponding first-stage regression. Standard errors of estimated coefficients are in parentheses, and 
p-values are in brackets. The result from the overidentification test reports the Sargan’s statistic. 
***: significant at 1%  
**: significant at 5% 
*: significant at 10% 
 
Table 4: Robustness Test with Additional Controls. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: 2SLS     
3.599* 4.304** 4.115** 3.621* Institutions 
(2.184) (1.983) (1.954) (2.119) 
-0.027   -0.021 Distance to the coast 
(0.024)   (0.021) 
 -0.010   Total primary school enrollment 
 (0.013)   
  0.566 0.550 Initial condition ( in 1985) 
  (0.542) (0498) 
Panel B: First-Stage Regression     
0.036** 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.037** Christian lower primary school enrollment 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
-0.007**   -0.005** Distance to the coast 
(0.002)   (0.002) 
 0.003   Total primary school enrollment 
 (0.002)   
  0.196*** 0.167*** Initial condition (in 1985) 
  (0.064) (0.064) 
R2 0.25 0.19 0.29 0.35 
 
Notes: Panel A reports 2SLS estimates with the log GDP per capita in 2003 as the dependent variable, and Panel B 
reports the corresponding first-stage regression. Standard errors of estimated coefficients are in parentheses.  
***: significant at 1% 
**: significant at 5% 
*: significant at 10% 
Table 5: Robustness Tests with Different Institution Measurements. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: 2SLS    





Comprehensive Institutional Index  5.546*   
(2.89) 
 
Index for government refrains of informal fees   2.42* 
(1.24) 
Panel B: First-Stage Regression    





Comprehensive Institutional Index  0.033* 
(0.018) 
 
Index for government refrains of informal fees   0.077** 
(0.029) 
R2 0.14 0.06 0.12 
 
Notes: Panel A reports 2SLS estimates with the log GDP per capita in 2003 as the dependent variable, and Panel B 
reports the first-stage regression with the listed institution measurement as the dependent variable for each 
specification. In Panel B, the explanatory variable is the instrument, that is, the enrollment in Christian missionary 
lower primary schools in 1919. Standard errors of estimated coefficients are in parentheses. The first column is our 
main specification in Table 3. 
***: significant at 1% 
**: significant at 5% 
*: significant at 10% 
 
 
Table 6: Geography versus Institutions. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: 2SLS 
3.559* 3.400* 3.949** 3.950** 3.479* Institutions 
(1.874) (1.923) (1.867) (2.057) (1.932) 
-0.016    0.034 Latitude 
(0.011)    (0.060) 
 0.027*   0.712 Temperature 
 (0.016)   (0.079) 
  0.026  0.004 Rainfalls 
  (0.020)  (0.032) 
   0.142 0.016 North-south dummy 
   (0.178) (0.300) 
Panel B: First-Stage Regression  
0.043** 0.042** 0.045*** 0.040** 0.042** Christian lower primary school enrollment 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
-0.035    0.016 Latitude 
(0.225)    (0.010) 
 0.001   0.018 Temperature 
 (0.003)   (0.013) 
  -0.002  -0.006 Rainfall 
  (0.003)  (0.005) 
   0.039 0.104** North-south dummy 
   (0.027) (0.046) 
R2 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.28 
 
Notes: Panel A reports 2SLS estimates with log GDP per capita in 2003 as the dependent variable, and Panel B 
reports the corresponding first stage. Standard errors of estimated coefficients are in parentheses. The north-south 
dummy takes on a value of one when a city is located in Northern China and zero when is located in Southern 
China.   
***: significant at 1% 
**: significant at 5% 





Table 7: Policy versus Institutions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: 2SLS       
3.866* 4.405** 4.249*** 4.393** 4.035* 3.383** Institution 
(2.294) (2.098) (2.167) (2.302) (2.291) (1.534) 
-0.413      West dummy 
(0.320)      
0.056      East dummy 
(0.338)      
 -0.119  -0.119   Dummy for coastal open cities 
 (0.197)  (0.198)   
  -0.004 0.002   Dummy for provincial level and deputy 
provincial level cities   (0.166) (0.165)   
    0.999  Government consumption/GDP 
    (3.524)  
Investment rate in 2004      -1.438** 
(0.717) 
Panel B: First-Stage Regression       
0.035** 0.041** 0.042** 0.040** 0.038** 0.051*** Christian lower primary school enrollment 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
0.055      West dummy 
(0.053)      
0.107***      East dummy 
(0.035)      
 0.040  0.039   Dummy for coastal open cities 
 (0.030)  (0.031)   
  0.012 0.009   Dummy for provincial level and deputy 
provincial level cities   (0.028) (0.028)   
    0.699  Government consumption/GDP 
    (0.510)  
Investment rate in 2004      0.272* 
(0.137) 
R2 0.30 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.21 
Notes: Panel A reports 2SLS estimates with the log GDP per capita in 2003 as the dependent variable, and Panel B 
reports the corresponding first-stage regression. Standard errors of estimated coefficients are in parentheses. In 
column (1), the dummy for cities in middle China is omitted in the regression.  
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
A1: Data Descriptions and Sources. 
Data Descriptions Sources 
Log GDP per capita in 2003   
 
From the Urban statistical Yearbook of China (2004)   
Institutions 
(Average protection of property rights, 2002-2003) 
 
From Ni (2004 and 2005) 
Christian lower primary school enrollment 
(Enrollment in Christian missionary lower primary 
schools per 1,000 persons in 1919) 
 
From the Continuation Committee (1922) 
Distance to the coast 
 
From Au and Henderson (2002) 
Total primary school enrollment (Enrollment in 
missionary and government primary schools per 1,000 
persons in 1919) 
 
From the Continuation Committee (1922) 
Initial condition 
(Log national income per capita in 19851) 
 
From the Urban statistical Yearbook of China (1986)   
Christian higher primary school enrollment (Enrollment 
in Christian missionary higher primary schools per 
1,000 persons in 1919) 
 
From the Continuation Committee (1922) 
Latitude 
 
From Au and Henderson (2002) 
Temperature (Average in centigrade) 
 
From various Provincial Statistical Yearbook of China (2004) 
Rainfall (in millimeters) 
 
From the various Provincial Statistical Yearbooks of China 
(2004) 
The ratio between government consumption and GDP in 
2003(2) 
From the Urban statistical Yearbook of China (2004)   
 
Note:  (1) National income = gross agricultural value + value added in industry 
(2) Government consumption is the net government spending on expenditures on education, science and 
social security. 
 
A2: Main Data Used in the Paper. 




































Shenzhen 10.90678 0.716 3.354157 Guangzhou 10.78668 0.5265 0.81036
Wenzhou 9.714625 0.703 0.363966 Yantai 9.914477 0.656 1.352353
Ningbo 10.39326 0.874 0.605413 Chongqing 8.996776 0.612 0.207788
Shanghai 10.75188 0.8575 0.867647 Chengdu 9.800956 0.662 0.657268
Jiaxing 10.15782 0.768 0.236241 Weihai 10.42709 0.5495 0.389025
Huzhou 9.857548 0.672 0.375335 Zhuhai 10.984 0.68 0.744186
Shaoxing 10.13122 0.8105 0.342742 Nanchang 9.573733 0.625 0.304401
Zhongshan 10.50819 0.6675 0.744186 Hefei 9.279866 0.5585 0.123119
Taizhou 9.800402 0.6095 0.202358 Shijiazhuang 9.628261 0.614 0.033106
Suzhou 10.77254 0.7565 0.566417 Dalian 10.28213 0.632 0.204756
Xiamen 10.46336 0.896 4.202231 Changsha 9.603058 0.5515 0.580194
Hangzhou 10.39876 0.716 0.807204 Haikou 9.724959 0.5675 0.322727
Qingdao 10.06041 0.824 2.674683 Xi'an 9.411892 0.646 0.520519
Beijing 10.3754 0.679 1.222187 Kunming 9.699656 0.5295 0.640646
Dongguan 11.00473 0.6365 0.707389 Tianjin 10.18611 0.641 0.415557
Zhoushan 9.780133 0.699 0.216511 Wuhan 9.973806 0.5035 1.198144
Nantong 9.466841 0.7255 0.013829 Fuzhou 9.929155 0.5805 2.4713
Changzhou 10.17157 0.641 0.303127 Shenyang 10.05496 0.5195 0.597351
Wuxi 10.67255 0.6825 0.32671 Changchun 9.836546 0.58 0.133644
Quanzhou 9.820867 0.608 1.233659 Qinhuangdao 9.563529 0.689 0.637698
Foshan 10.60767 0.646 0.141509 Haerbin 9.607236 0.5325 0.26263
Nanjing 10.2149 0.7195 0.875139 Zhengzhou 9.744668 0.517 0.19503
Jinan 10.06858 0.633 0.336659 Xuzhou 9.20954 0.524 0.292204
Huizhou 9.940687 0.558 0.148392     
 
 
 
 
